Author : Giga Jokhadze
The full-scale aggression launched by Russia against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked the beginning of irreversible geopolitical shifts. In those difficult days of February, perhaps no one could have imagined that the war would last more than 1,400 days, surpassing even the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in duration, all while Russia’s global influence would be noticeably weakened in the fourth year of the war.
The protracted war, which has noticeably exhausted Putin’s regime, has created a historic opportunity for countries in the former Soviet space, the Communist bloc, and beyond. Many of these countries have seized this historic opportunity to bolster their security and diminish Russia’s military, economic, and political influence within their borders. It is an established fact that the Russian Federation can no longer project power across the post-Soviet space as dominantly as it did 5 or 10 years ago. The Kremlin’s influence has diminished dramatically not only in the post-Soviet area, but also in all major regions of the world, including the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.
The only state that has squandered the historical opportunity presented by Russia’s weakening is Georgia. Now, let’s review the list of states that have escaped the Kremlin’s influence since the start of the war in Ukraine.
Finland: Despite its military victory in the Winter War (1939–1940), Finland was forced to cede part of its territory to the Soviet Union. Finland remained a neutral state for nearly 75 years following this. After Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine, the Finns realized that they could become Russia’s next target under the conditions of neutrality and that the strongest guarantee of security would be membership in the most powerful military alliance in world history—NATO. In 2023, Finland became the 31st member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Kremlin cited preventing NATO’s eastward expansion as one of the primary goals for starting the war in Ukraine. However, Putin achieved the exact opposite: with Finland’s NATO membership, the Alliance’s shared border with Russia increased by 1,340 kilometres, effectively doubling it.
Sweden: Following its defeat in the Finnish War (1808–1809), the Kingdom of Sweden was forced to cede one-third of its territory. From that point onward, Sweden remained a neutral state for more than two centuries. It did not abandon this policy of neutrality during either of the two World Wars, the Cold War, or the period that followed. The decision to end this centuries-old tradition of neutrality was prompted by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although Sweden does not share a direct border with Russia, the threat posed by Russian aggression compelled the country to renounce its military neutrality and join the most powerful military alliance in world history—NATO.
Armenia: During the Second Karabakh War, Armenia requested that the Kremlin-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) invoke Article 4 to assist in maintaining its territorial integrity. However, the organization did not bother to defend the member state. The severe defeat in the war convinced the Armenian government that Russia is not a reliable ally. Disillusioned by the ‘leaky’ Russian security umbrella, Armenia turned its gaze toward the West. In January 2025, Armenia signed a strategic partnership agreement with the United States. Armenia has proactively begun work on signing an Association Agreement with the European Union and on achieving visa liberalization. Furthermore, Armenia’s incumbent prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, is actively confronting the Kremlin’s network of agents entrenched within the Armenian Patriarchate. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for June in Armenia, and according to all sociological surveys, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party is the clear favourite.
Azerbaijan: Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan deteriorated sharply in December 2024, when Russian air defence shot down an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft. In response, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, took several decisive anti-Russian steps: (1) he demonstratively refrained from traveling to Moscow on May 9, 2025, for the Victory Day celebrations; (2) Azerbaijani special services conducted a raid on the Sputnik office and detained several employees on charges of espionage for Russia; and (3) Azerbaijan banned Russian-language instruction in schools.
Moldova: Just one month after the start of the war in Ukraine, Moldova applied for EU candidate status alongside Ukraine and Georgia. On June 23, 2022, Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidate status. Shortly thereafter, in December 2023, the European Union opened accession negotiations with Moldova. Meanwhile, Moldova’s pro-European government began the process of withdrawing from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Over the past two years, the Kremlin has attempted to interfere in Moldova’s internal affairs several times but has failed miserably each time. The first attempt was in October 2024, when Moldova held a referendum on EU membership. Despite substantial Russian interference, most of the population supported the country’s accession to the European Union. The second instance of Russian interference occurred during the fall 2025 parliamentary elections. Despite the Kremlin’s hybrid special operation, the party of the incumbent Prime Minister Maia Sandu won the elections in a landslide.
As of January 2026, Moldova and Ukraine have placed the Russian-occupied Transnistria region under a logistical blockade. This is a geopolitical catastrophe for Russia since it does not share a direct land border with the occupied territory and can no longer supply the 1,500 troops stationed there. Recently, the Moldovan government has also been discussing the prospect of unification with Romania, a move supported by many citizens of Moldova.
Romania: Russian interference in the 2024 parliamentary elections was on an unprecedented scale. Consequently, Romania’s Constitutional Court declared the election results invalid. Despite the Kremlin’s opposition, the pro-European candidate, Nicușor Dan, emerged victorious in the re-run. NATO strengthened its military presence in Romania, recognizing its critical importance to the Alliance’s eastern flank. Romania procured dozens of F-16 multirole fighter jets from its allies and enacted a law granting the Romanian military the authority to shoot down any flying object entering the country’s airspace. Additionally, Romania tightened its legislation regarding companies and individuals aiding Russia in evading Western sanctions.
Kazakhstan: For decades, Kazakhstan was considered Russia’s exclusive zone of influence. However, the country’s new leader has begun to gradually diminish Russian influence by replacing it with a multi-vector foreign policy. Kazakhstan primarily seeks to counter the Kremlin’s influence by deepening political and economic ties with the People’s Republic of China. In 2023, the Tokayev administration introduced the Language Development Initiative, which aims to promote the Kazakh language and gradually replace Russian with Kazakh among the population. In recent years, multibillion-dollar Chinese investments have flowed into Kazakhstan. While Russia had been Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner for two decades, Beijing surpassed Moscow in this category in 2023 as Kazakhstan plays a vital role in China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. Due to the protracted war in Ukraine, Russia lacks the resources to counterbalance China’s growing political and economic influence.
Syria: The decision to intervene in the Syrian Civil War was made by the Russian president in the autumn of 2015, at a time when Bashar al-Assad’s regime was struggling to survive. Assad retained power largely due to the Russian Air Force’s continuous bombardment of rebel positions. In gratitude, Assad leased the naval port of Tartus to Russia for 49 years and built the Khmeimim airbase in Latakia. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, however, Assad’s position gradually weakened. In December 2024, rebels captured Damascus, forcing Assad to flee to Moscow. Meanwhile, Russian military units were completely evacuated from their bases in Syria. Consequently, Russia lost its military bases in the Middle East and its last instrument for projecting power over the region.
Iran: The Ayatollah regime is Putin’s last remaining ally in the Middle East. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Iran has assisted Russia by supplying drones and artillery shells. In June 2025, the United States and Israel launched an attack on the Islamic Republic with the aim of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program. First, Israel disabled Iran’s air defence systems, including the Russian S-400s. Then, the U.S. used B-2 stealth bombers to strike Iran’s primary nuclear facilities. Defeat in the 13-day war dealt a fatal blow to the Ayatollah regime. Following the war, the economic crisis deepened. Protests against rising prices and inflation began in December 2025 and quickly spread like wildfire across the country, transforming into a full-scale revolution.
Protests in Iran are still ongoing. Whether the Ayatollah regime will soon end remains to be seen in the coming weeks; however, it is already a reality that the weakened Islamic Republic is no longer able to assist Russia in the war in Ukraine on the same scale as it has over the past three years.
Venezuela: In the Western Hemisphere, which the United States has considered its exclusive sphere of influence since the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the Maduro regime was Putin’s last stronghold . On January 3, 2026, as part of a successful military operation in Venezuela, the United States arrested and transported the Venezuelan president to the United States in less than two hours. Furthermore, American vessels in the Atlantic Ocean seized several oil tankers sailing under the Russian flag that were transporting sanctioned oil. Consequently, with the overthrow of the Maduro regime, Putin lost his most powerful ally in the Western Hemisphere.
Europe: Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Europe was critically dependent on Russian energy resources. The ‘Old Continent’ received 40% of its natural gas, 27% of its oil, and 45% of its coal from Russia. By the fourth year of the war in Ukraine, these figures have dropped to 15%, 10%, and 5%, respectively. Poland, the Baltic States, and the Czech Republic have completely ceased purchasing Russian energy resources.
The war in Ukraine has breathed new life into plans for Europe’s remilitarization. Germany has decided to increase its defence spending from 85 billion to 152 billion euros by 2029. The European Union has established an 800 billion euro “Defence Fund” aimed at bolstering Europe’s defensive capabilities over the next decade. Europe’s remilitarization is further fuelled by the Trump administration’s rigid transatlantic policy, which forces NATO member states to increase their defence spending from 2% to 5% of their GDP.
Georgia—A Squandered Chance: The only state that did not take advantage of the opportunity created by the war in Ukraine is Georgia. Since the start of the conflict, the Georgian Dream party has sharply increased the country’s political and economic dependence on Russia. The country has become a “safe haven” for Russians fleeing the war, as well as one of the primary transit hubs for exporting dual-use goods into Russia. From the very first days of the war, the Georgian Dream sided with Russia, accusing Ukraine of failing to avoid the war (i.e., refusing to agree to capitulate) and declaring the main instigator of the war as first the imaginary “Global War Party”, then also the imaginary “Deep State”—when in reality, they meant the West.
In the spring of 2024, the Georgian Dream party adopted the Russian Law, through which it attempted to silence critical voices, cement authoritarianism, and expel the West from the country. Subsequently, it rigged the 2024 parliamentary elections, which no Western state recognized. One month after the electoral fraud, Ivanishvili’s Prime Minister, Kobakhidze, announced the suspension of the EU accession process until 2028. Enraged by the fraudulent elections and the severance of relations with the EU, citizens took to the streets in peaceful protest; however, the Georgian Dream dispersed them in the style of Igor Rodionov1, poisoned them with chemical weapons, and illegally detained and tortured hundreds of individuals. In 2025, Georgian Dream passed a series of repressive laws that are even more severe than those in Russia or Belarus.
A truly nationalist government would have capitalized on Russia’s weakening in Ukraine. At the very least, it would have opened EU accession negotiations immediately upon receiving candidate status. It would have started implementing the tasks necessary for membership and strengthening democracy and human rights in preparation for the next wave of EU enlargement. However, Georgian Dream did exactly the opposite. While the leadership of every self-respecting state is striving to adapt to the shifted geopolitical context following the war in Ukraine and escape the Russian sphere of influence, the actions of Georgia’s de facto government are not only squandering a historical chance, but also deliberately and consistently betraying national interests.
