Author : Levan Tarkhnishvili
In 2007, the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, with the support of the Cordaid Foundation (Netherlands) and the Open Society Institute Research Centers Foundation (Hungary), published the sixth book in the ‘Society and Politics’ series. Along with other articles, it featured letters from Georgian academicians and researchers titled ‘10 Questions on the 15th Anniversary of Georgia’s Independence’. The starting point was taken as the international recognition of independence, i.e., 1992. The first question read: ‘What has Georgia achieved and what has it failed to achieve during the period of independence? How has Georgian society and culture changed (if at all) during this period? Which traits (or changes) of society (culture) have had the greatest influence on political processes?’ I was one of the authors of these letters. A few days ago, while looking for a document on my computer, I stumbled upon this text. After reading it again, I found it fascinating to return to this question 18 years later.
In 2007, we considered the main achievements since the declaration of independence to be: (a) the preservation of Georgia’s independence and the existence of an independent state policy; (b) the involvement of society in the country’s development and the increase of its role in these processes; and (c) established and developed international relations.
When discussing failures, we noted that stable governance institutions (governmental, non-governmental, and business structures alike) had yet to be established in Georgia. In 2007, we considered the second major problem to be that, up to that point, a ruling power in Georgia had never been replaced through elections. Another issue was the fact that our society failed to perceive itself as a single whole. To this day, the consolidation and integration of various ethnic, religious, or social groups into a unified society has not been achieved. I believed then, and I remain convinced now, that this phenomenon causes more headaches for Georgia than the fourth greatest failure—the temporary occupation of Georgian territories.
So, three achievements and four problems.
Where are we now, 18 years later? Let’s start with the issue that was, at least formally, resolved—on October 1, 2012, for the first time in Georgia’s history, the government was handed over through elections. The United National Movement conceded defeat and yielded the reins of power to Georgian Dream. This day should have become a historic milestone, paving the way toward a stable democracy which, in turn, would have ensured the country’s development and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic space.
‘What did we actually get?’ As Kakha Bendukidze1 said—a step forward, but into a pile of manure. Beyond its symbolism, the transfer of power through elections has a practical purpose: it ensures the consistent replacement of rulers, where each subsequent leader or party builds upon the foundations laid by their predecessor. In analysing the post-socialist transformation of Central and Eastern European countries, some experts noted a ‘pendulum principle’ in leadership changes—a right-wing leader or party being replaced by a left-wing one, often a former Communist party member or follower. These changes caused certain fluctuations in reforms, but the macro-direction of the reforms, as well as the country’s overall development vector, remained the same. As a result, these countries are now members of the EU and NATO, and even the rise of ultra-populist or pro-Russian rulers (which are often the same) cannot shake their sovereignty or development.
Georgian Dream, covertly from the day it took power and overtly since 2019, derailed Georgia from its natural, Euro-Atlantic development vector. At the initial stage, this was reflected in their election program, albeit ambiguously, that Georgia should no longer be a cause for tension between the West and Russia. To be fair, this the slogan was met with approval by many people who support reconciliation with Russia or are simply tired of confrontation, both inside and outside the country. Then came the release of Russian spies under the guise of political prisoners, the transfer of classified information to Russia, and purges within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence aimed at replacing pro-Western, Western-educated personnel with pro-Russian ones. This was followed by the arrest and suspicious deaths of special forces members who had fought against Russia (including almost the entire contingent of the Kodori-2007 operation), the weakening and eventual dismantling of the defence and security systems, and the increase of economic and energy dependence on Russia. All this happened in the first years of Georgian Dream’s rule; however, a portion of society, obsessed by the desire to defeat or take revenge on the United National Movement, failed to notice these obvious signs—and our Western partners, following their lead, did the same.
Emboldened by a comfortable status quo, Georgian Dream took the next step—effectively and openly beginning the implementation of the Russian plan. To quote my lifelong friend, Givi Targamadze, this Russian plan involves several key components: a loyal government, demilitarization, denationalization (meaning the loss of national identity), and a neutral status. The first two attributes are already evident—for thirteen years, Georgia has been governed by a leadership absolutely loyal to Russia, and we have already discussed the vulnerability of a Georgia left defenceless as a result of demilitarization.
Tea Tsulukiani’s2 ‘Parliamentary Commission’ has completed the core part of the third step—the rewriting of 200 years of history. As a result of this revisionism, the occupier Russia has been effectively branded a friend, while our real friends and partners are labelled enemies. The wars with Russia are blamed on Georgia, and the occupied territories have entirely vanished from the agenda. Furthermore, the most successful nine years of Georgia’s recent history (2003–2012) have been subjected to this same revisionism. Thus, by the thirteenth year of Georgian Dream’s rule, we are faced with a devastating picture—virtually nothing remains of our three major achievements.
What are the criteria for evaluating any given period of governance? The answer is simple: what was the state/organization/entity like at the beginning of that period, and what did the ruler leave behind when they left? Let’s look at three important things: the State, Euro-Atlantic integration, and elections as one of the main instruments of democracy and the strength of social institutions.
The State: In 2003, Georgia was widely considered to be a failed state—and that is how the United National Movement inherited it. In 2012, Georgia was flawed and problematic, but it was a state—and that is how Georgian Dream inherited it. Since 2012, they have done everything to destroy state institutions, exacerbating existing problems and creating new ones. As a result, Georgia is as far from being a modern Western-style state today as it was in 2003, albeit in a different sense. You can call the country whatever you want — Bidzina’s backyard, Russia’s backwater, a provincial oligarch’s toy — but it is no longer an independent sovereign state.
Euro-Atlantic Integration: Since Georgia’s independence—and certainly during the 2003–2012 period—the country’s foreign course and aspirations were never put into question. In the near future, Georgian Dream will attempt, through new ‘elections’ and the banning of political parties, to secure a constitutional majority and replace Article 78 of the Constitution—which guarantees the country’s Euro-Atlantic choice—with a constitutional record regarding neutral status.
In 2012, we were much closer to Euro-Atlantic structures and individual partner countries than in 2003. Now, we are further away than ever before in our recent history. This trajectory was sealed by the European Commission’s 2025 report, published at the end of October. The report on Georgia notes that the state of democracy in the country has significantly deteriorated, which negatively affects the EU accession process. Following the European Council’s December 2024 conclusion—stating that Georgian authorities’ course of action jeopardised the country’s European path, and de facto halted the accession process—and amid continued backsliding on fundamental issues, the Commission considers Georgia a candidate country in name only. ‘The Georgian authorities must demonstrate resolute commitment to reverse course and return to the EU accession path,’ reads the European Commission’s 2025 communication on enlargement policy.
It is also noted that the decision of the Georgian government in November 2024 not to pursue the opening of accession negotiations unequivocally confirmed their shift away from the policies of previous governments, the European aspirations of the vast majority of the Georgian people, and the commitment inscribed in the Constitution of Georgia to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU.
Today, we have a government sanctioned by our partners, led by an equally sanctioned informal ruler. The country is in total isolation, and the only one praising us is the occupier, Russia. For the first time in Georgia’s history, we are standing on the wrong side of the global chessboard.
Elections: In 2012, for the first time in Georgia’s history, the government conceded defeat, handed power to the opposition, and moved into the opposition itself. Need I remind you what happened in 2024? What is happening in the streets today? The step for the annulment of elections is the abolition of political parties, and the legal platform for this has already been established through legislative changes and the ‘conclusion’ of the Tsulukiani Commission.
Georgian Dream did not stop there and effectively banned politics itself. On November 6, 2025, the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal prosecution against the leaders of various opposition parties—Mikheil Saakashvili, Giorgi Vashadze, Nika Gvaramia, Nika Melia, Zurab Japaridze, Elene Khoshtaria, Mamuka Khazaradze, and Badri Japaridze. The most ‘interesting’ part of the charges concerns the sanctions—according to the Prosecutor’s Office, these politicians, ‘to the detriment of Georgia’s state interests and with the aim of creating an artificial basis for the imposition of international sanctions, provided representatives of foreign states with information regarding the import of petroleum products to Georgia, as well as real or fabricated information in their possession regarding Georgia’s military sphere, and spread false information claiming that Georgian airspace was supposedly being used to supply Iranian combat drones to the Russian Federation. In addition to the above, they periodically provided representatives of foreign states with information and documentary materials, including lists of persons employed in public service, for the purpose of imposing sanctions. As a result, various countries imposed sanctions on a total of nearly 300 Georgian citizens, including political officials, civil servants, and individual businessmen.
In effect, the Prosecutor’s Office has voiced two clear messages: first, from this day forward, any political statement, as well as any relationship with foreigners, is a punishable offense; and second, a message to our foreign partners—if you impose sanctions on us, we have hostages whom we will let rot in prison.
It must be said that this is not the first attack on independent institutions and individuals. Despite popular belief, Georgian Dream launched its assault on dissent and opposing views almost immediately upon taking power. The first targets were the self-governing institutions, which they did not control in 2012. Through blackmail, arrests, and bribery, by the 2014 local elections, Georgian Dream exerted total control over local self-governance—and it has never relinquished that grip since.
Next was the media. Today, everyone agrees that the Communications Commission is the primary tool for pressure and retaliation against independent television stations. But where did it all begin? In 2013. Several things happened that year—the government suddenly took an interest in the construction businesses of the Commission’s then-chairman, Irakli Chikovani. A case was quickly ‘cooked up’ and Chikovani, thinking it better to step aside, resigned. One of his deputies, Karlo Kvitashvili, took over as acting chairman. At this point, Member of Parliament Tina Khidasheli enters the stage. Under her chairmanship, a parliamentary commission was formed to ‘investigate’ the communications sector. Her investigation closely resembles Tsulukiani’s current ‘activities’ and ended with a whole series of forced resignations. The Commission was subsequently headed by figures loyal to Georgian Dream—first Zura Abashidze, and then the current chairman, the sanctioned Kakhi Bekauri. This was followed by sanctions against television stations, the banning of political advertising, the artificial reduction of their revenues, and eventually, the initiation of restrictive legislative changes. This also included the tracking and control of movement via mobile phone data.
In 2013, the second target of the assault was the Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB). While GPB had never been close to the required professional standards, but compared to its current state, in 2012 it was practically the BBC or ARD. As with the Communications Commission, several fronts were opened here as well. The State Audit Office began to inspect the organization, followed by the Financial Police (by law, GPB has its own internal audit and is subsequently vetted by an external audit; state structures are not supposed to interfere), which with ‘record-breaking speed’, handed the case over to the Prosecutor’s Office, and pressure began to mount on the then Director General. The Director resigned, and the Board of Trustees elected a successor. The ‘Dreamers’ shifted their focus to the newcomer. The new director proved more compliant, yet the Board remained beyond their control. The Board passed votes of no confidence against the director two times, but the court twice sided with the government’s position and reinstated him (doesn’t this sound familiar?). Simultaneously, pressure was mounted on individual board members. Tina Khidasheli’s commission and law enforcement agencies stepped in; the son of one board member was arrested and used as a tool for blackmail. When they failed to break the majority of the board, at Ms. Khidasheli’s suggestion, they simply changed the law, abolished the existing Board, and announced a competition for a new one.
After the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) intervened in the matter, the Dreamers appeared to back down (at the time, flirting with Europeans was still a priority) and allowed the current Board to complete its term—though they elected a new one simultaneously. As soon as the situation calmed down, they changed the law again, stripped the existing Board of its powers, and handed real governance over to the Board they controlled. As a result, we gradually got a monster that fights against the public using the public’s money.
The attacks on the media did not end there. At least two independent broadcasters became targets of the Dreamers’ assault. As always, everything was masked with beautiful words—‘restoring justice.’ In the case of Rustavi 2, their ‘restoring justice’ meant ‘returning’ a multiple-times resold organization to its ‘true’ (read: obedient) owners. However, prior to that, there was a deliberate attempt to destroy Rustavi 2 as a media entity. The primary instruments were the same: the financial police and the prosecutor’s office. Never mind that the definition of a ‘true owner’ was incomprehensible from the start and changed multiple times. Following the takeover of Rustavi 2, the assault on the media intensified. As a result, ‘Mtavari’ is no longer broadcasting, and the remaining outlets face dire financial straits, with their survival hanging by a thread. New legislation has effectively made it impossible to secure alternative funding sources, such as advertising or grants. The government went even further in its attack on the non-governmental sector—the so-called ‘Russian Law’ and its accompanying acts have rendered the functioning of independent organizations impossible. The final blow is now being prepared against universities in the form of a so-called ‘Education Reform,’ scheduled to take effect in 2026, aimed at extinguishing the last remaining embers of independence.
To summarize: by 2025, of the three major achievements of our independence—an independent state, Euro-Atlantic integration, and strong independent social institutions—effectively nothing remains. Let us turn to the four core problems:
We have already discussed the first two (the replacement of government through elections and the continuity of governance/stability of institutions) and noted that in these areas, the situation has only worsened. Similarly, no progress is observed regarding the second problem—the return of occupied territories. On the contrary, there is a growing fear that through the promise of creating a ‘Confederation’, Georgian Dream will set the country on a path toward recognizing the ‘independence’ of the occupied territories.
One final challenge remains: our society has failed to perceive itself as a single, cohesive entity. To this day, we have not achieved the consolidation or integration of various ethnic, religious, or social groups into a unified society. Members of ethnic minorities living in Georgia often do not perceive themselves full-fledged citizens of the country. Moreover, Georgians themselves are constantly dividing the society into ‘ours’ and ‘others’—the divide may fall along religious lines, political views, regional origins, or other formal markers, yet the degree of fragmentation never diminishes. Currently, another dividing line has been added to these fractures—the one between the government and the rest of society. Never in Georgia’’s recent history has a government been so detached from its people and, at the same time, so intensely in conflict with its own population.
In 2007, I wrote that Georgia had not yet crossed the critical threshold beyond which a point of no return is reached. Moreover, no ongoing reform in any field was ultimately reinforced by a solid institutional basis. For the stability of the system, it was essential that, alongside institutionalization, several centerscentres of gravity be established—centerscentres that would be sufficiently autonomous on one hand, while sharing a convergent vector of development on the other. Unfortunately, this was not achieved, and today we are far further from our goals than we were in 2007.
I truly do not wish to conclude this article on a pessimistic note; therefore, I would like to highlight a positive element—the resilience and protest of Georgian society, which has been ongoing for a year now and has already achieved significant successes: the non-recognition of the stolen elections, and the delegitimization and isolation of the government both at home and abroad. Now is the time to move to the next stage and demonstrate that we are capable of uniting around a common goal, of developing, and of transforming. Our ability to achieve this will determine the fate of each and every one of us, our families, and our society as a whole; it will define the trajectory of our country and, ultimately, decide whether we will live in an independent and modern Georgia or in the backyard of Russia, subordinate to the oligarch.
1. Kakha Bendukidze (1956–2014): A prominent Georgian statesman, businessman, and philanthropist often regarded as the architect of Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution economic miracle. As Minister of Economy and later State Minister for Reform Coordination, he implemented radical libertarian reforms, drastically reducing bureaucracy and corruption while liberalizing the economy. He founded the Free University of Tbilisi and remained a fierce critic of institutional stagnation and Russian imperial influence until his death.
2. Tea Tsulukiani (b. 1975): A high-ranking official of the Georgian Dream party who has served in various pivotal roles, including Minister of Justice and Minister of Culture. Often viewed as one of the party’s most uncompromising ideologues, her tenure has been marked by a sharp departure from Western-oriented institutional norms. In the context of 2026, her leadership in Parliamentary Commissions is associated with a state-led effort to reinterpret Georgia’s modern history, marginalizing pro-Western narratives and the achievements of the 2003–2012 reform era in favor of a narrative more aligned with regional de-escalation and proximity to Russian interests.
