Author : Tengo Gogotishvili
‘The export of chaos is a feature not a bug in this Russian approach to international engagement; and we should be ready for this to continue until Putin is forced to change his calculus.’
Blaise Metreweli, Chief of the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
That day, something exploded right above my head. Of all the familiar sounds, this one most resembled an explosion—the blast of a shell. Yet there was no shockwave. No one was killed, and there was no fire or smoke. You’ve now spent about as much time reading this as I did thinking about it back then. To stop wasting your time: it was just a sound barrier breaking ‘burst’. Specifically, the sound of an Italian Air Force F-35 breaking the sound barrier right above my head—an act which is always accompanied by such a wave. Usually, pilots do this far from populated areas and at specific altitudes. That day, though—who knows what made that Italian pilot’s blood boil—he essentially ‘aimed’ right at me.
The story takes place in Latvia. In a small seaside town, the sky above which became a training ground for NATO fighter jets for several days. In addition to Italian F-35s, Spanish Eurofighters and Hungarian Gripens flew very low during those days.
Flying? No, they were cutting through the air with a loud whoosh. This ‘whoosh‘ is the definitive answer to the favourite question of Russian propagandists and their paid or free mouthpieces: ‘What exactly will NATO do if Putin attacks? Who is NATO, anyway?
NATO is the citizen living in the territory stretching from Svalbard (which the Russians call Spitsbergen) to Crete, and from Tartu to Alaska (at least when you spin the globe from East to West). With only a few minor exceptions.
NATO is my children, whom I took to school in Latvia a few weeks ago. From a distance, I was struck by the number of flashing sirens. At first, I thought someone had fallen ill and an ambulance had been called. But as I drew closer, I found an armoured personnel carrier parked alongside the ambulances, police cars, and fire engines. That day, two lessons at school were dedicated to safety; they had brought in the equipment and the people whose job it is to guarantee this safety.
Just try it: visit the website of the Latvian Ministry of Defence and look for the brochures titled ‘What to do in the first 72 hours/3 days of a crisis.’ Among many scenarios, one specifically addresses a drone attack. The map illustrates which regions of the country Russian drones could reach (I hope you won’t ask why only a Russian attack scenario is considered). It provides the technical specifications of the most dangerous drone, the Iranian ‘Shahed’ (known in Russian as ‘Geran’).
- What should we do?
- We should notify the police and cordon off the area as far as possible.
- What should we not do?
- We should not touch it.
Personally, I like this part best—the warning that any report of the Latvian government’s capitulation will be a ‘fake’ by definition. ‘Together with our NATO allies, we will protect every one of you!’ ‘Do not cooperate with the aggressor.’
The Latvians didn’t come up with the idea for these brochures out of thin air. The Swedes, years ago, while still strictly neutral, began printing similar manuals and mailing them to every citizen. They were neutral, yes, but they always sensed the threat.
On September 9th, Russia launched an attack on NATO—two dozen drones entered Polish airspace. Several of the country’s airports were forced to close for hours.
According to the statement of the Polish government, they shot down four drones. The rest, one must assume, simply fell out of the sky when they ran out of fuel or battery charge. For months now, Russian propaganda has been treating this event as if it were equivalent to the 1945 fall of Berlin. They portray it as a magnificent triumph and revel in the claim that the ‘mighty NATO’ could offer no resistance to their attack.
However, when this story is broken down step-by-step, minute-by-minute, it looks radically different.
1. The drone launches were detected by Ukrainian military forces while the objects were still within Russian and Belarusian airspace. Three and a half years of combat have taught them to identify flying objects and determine their final targets with high precision.
2. Leveraging this experience, the Ukrainians notified the Poles in advance that their territory was one of the possible targets of the strike.
3. The warning was so timely that the Poles managed to raise their aircraft into the air and put their air defences on alert.
4. The drones, which crossed the Polish air border, were met by Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s, and from the ground they were targeted by German Patriot systems.
5. Since fighter jets have small fuel tanks and typically cannot fly for more than an hour, Belgian aerial tankers were in the air with them for mid-air refuelling. Simultaneously, Italian reconnaissance aircraft were providing full operational control.
6. Thus, it was not just Poland that responded to the Russian attack, but all of NATO, following its pre-approved operational protocol known as Quick Reaction Alert (QRA)
The Kremlin’s propagandists, however, don’t say anything about this. For them, it is far more profitable to shout that Russian drones entered NATO airspace without any hindrance and that the Alliance managed to destroy only four of them.
A ratio of 4 drones out of 23 (or 19, according to some estimates) seems strange at first, but it is not actually that strange if you do the math on a calculator. Or, until you do it yourself in writing:
The price of a drone—especially if it’s equipped with a simple camera and carries no explosive charge—ranges from $300 to $1,000. The cost of a single flight hour for an F-16 is approximately $25,000, while for an F-35, it reaches $42,000. A single Patriot missile costs $4 million. An air-to-air missile fired by a jet fighter costs anywhere from $400,000 to $1 million.’
Now, calculate how much money NATO saved by not shooting down every drone one by one. ‘We downed only those that posed a threat’—this statement from the Polish government confirms they clearly saw and calculated both the drones’ trajectories and the Russian intent in advance.
A few days later, the Russians tested NATO’s air defence over Estonia. Three MiG-31s remained in Estonian airspace for 12 minutes. No one fired at them, which once again gave wings to Kremlin propaganda—from Solovyov to Moroshkina. However, NATO later explained the reason behind it.
The Russians calculated it perfectly, flying over the Baltic Sea exactly on the border between Estonian and neutral airspace—violating it by only a few hundred meters. Had NATO fired a missile and hit the MiGs, the pilots would have had enough time to steer their aircraft back into neutral airspace. They would have then claimed that NATO attacked them without reason, using it as a pretext for retaliation.
A similar incident occurred ten years ago during the Syrian war, when the Turks fired at a Russian Su-25 in their airspace, though it crashed in a ‘non-Turkish’ zone.
Every single one of these incidents is a lesson. Russia is learning. NATO is learning.
Since the day the Baltic states joined NATO, the Alliance has been guarding their skies. Through rotations lasting several months, squadrons from allied nations take turns stationed at airfields in Lithuania and Estonia. They even keep their own ‘logs’. Here is the result of just a few days of their operations:
• On October 13, NATO fighters detected and ‘intercepted‘ a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft. The plane was flying in international airspace over the Kaliningrad region. It had its transponder and radio off. The crew did not send a pre-flight notification to the regional flight centre;
• On October 14, NATO fighter jets intercepted and ‘escorted‘ a Russian Il-20 flying from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia through international airspace. Once again, the transponder was off and no flight plan had been submitted. This time, however, they did stay in touch with the air traffic controllers on the radio;
• On the same October 14, NATO fighters were scrambled to intercept a Su-30, which was flying in international airspace near Kaliningrad with its transponder and radio off, without prior warning;
• On October 15, NATO fighters were scrambled to intercept a Su-30SM, which was flying in international airspace near Kaliningrad. It was also operating with its transponder and radio turned off, and without a pre-filed flight plan.
‘There is increasing talk that NATO will not help the Baltic states in the event of a Russian attack. Do you take this into account?’ I asked the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Latvian Army, General Georgs Kerlins.
‘They have been saying that since the very day we decided to join NATO,’ he replied.
General Kerlins is right. From day one, Russian propaganda—no matter the language it speaks or writes in—has been screaming that the British or the Italians couldn’t care less about the security of the distant Baltic states. ‘No one will fight for us’—they want every neighbour of Russia to think exactly this way.
‘Latvia fulfils all its obligations to its allies; therefore, the allies will fulfil theirs as well.’ General Kerlins has an example that significantly deflates the bluster of Russian propaganda. Since 2017, NATO’s ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ (EFP) forces have been stationed in Latvia, as well as in Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. This was the lesson of 2014—when all of NATO realized that its eastern members had not been panicking or exaggerating when they claimed, after August 2008, ‘We are next.’
Back then, it was decided to deploy multinational battalions in every member state that shared a land border with Russia. It was more than symbolic. It was so that Russia would know in advance that if they were to strike one of these small countries, it would mean they would have to shoot at soldiers from 5 or 10 more countries. And this really would be a war with the entire NATO.
2022 also provided a lesson. Similar multinational units were deployed in NATO countries neighbouring Ukraine. However, it was decided that both the new and existing forces would be expanded from battalions to brigades. In Latvia, the NATO brigade is stationed at the Ādaži military base, just 25 kilometres from the capital.
‘Is the foreign contingent in Ādaži more of a symbol, or is it a real force in case of possible aggression?’
General Kerlins: ‘It is both. Soldiers from 14 different countries are currently serving there, and of course, that is a powerful symbol. But at the same time, it is a highly combat-capable unit. Believe me, I have seen them in action.’
What proof do we have not to believe him? For Latvia, whose army consists of only 7,900 active personnel and 10,000 ‘Zemessardze’ volunteers (similar to our National Guard), the addition of a full brigade means an influx of nearly 4,000 extra soldiers and officers—all funded by someone else’s military budget.
Canada is the lead nation here—the brigade commander is appointed by Canada, and one Canadian battalion is always on the ground through rotation. Germany performs this function in Lithuania, the United Kingdom in Estonia, and the United States in Poland.
However, the main change isn’t just the expansion from a battalion to a brigade. Latvia has introduced two key innovations: increasing its defence budget to 5% (even before the decision was adopted at the last NATO summit) and the restoration of mandatory military service.
Conscription in these small-army nations is not like it was in the Soviet Union—it is not universal in the old sense. However, in one form or another, everyone is required to register and, quite often, undergo training.
Among the countries in the region, conscription is already active in Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Norway. The Swedish system is called ‘partially compulsory service’—any young man or woman of the appropriate age may be called up.
The exception so far is Poland, although its professional army is the largest in Europe (ranking 13th in the world)—300,000 active personnel plus 350,000 reservists. Prime Minister Tusk is openly calling for a transition to a mandatory service system.
Incidentally, German Defence Minister Pistorius is pursuing the same goal. While this idea has yet to gain a solid majority among local politicians, a single further provocation from Russia would be enough to shift that sentiment.
Just imagine Poland and Germany with mandatory military service systems. Or, if you prefer, look for historical parallels in books. In short, this is not at all what a Russian should want.
The word ‘should’ is underlined for a reason. Logically, it is not in Russia’s interest to awaken the Teutonic, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita), Viking, or Old Prussian spirits among the Germans, Poles, Balts, and Nordics. And then, to confront all these ghosts of the past, already united, alone. Yet, at times, it seems that this is exactly what they are trying to do.
Otherwise, Russia wouldn’t have created a situation where Sweden and Finland rushed into NATO without prolonged reflection or public debate.
Otherwise, it wouldn’t have allowed circumstances to escalate to a point where NATO was forced to respond by increasing military spending to 5% of GDP. Of this, 3.5% is to be dedicated strictly to military expenditures, while 1.5% is allocated for military research, cybersecurity, civil defence, and other related sectors.
Otherwise, Russia wouldn’t have forced the European Union to seriously begin its transformation into a defence alliance—appointing Andrius Kubilius, a man very familiar to Georgians, as the EU’s first-ever Defence Commissioner. Yes, that very same man whom the ‘Dreamer’ elite claimed had ‘gone missing’ in recent months, suggesting he finally realized they were right and could no longer criticize them. That same Kubilius has now been entrusted by 27 European nations with the unified defence policy of Europe. Precisely him. Commissioner Kubilius—whom political wrestlers of the calibre of Zarkua1 and Okhanashvili2 used to bite into a most peculiar ‘non-political’ part of the body is now working on strategic plans that must be urgently implemented by 2030.
‘This is the final deadline we have before Russia attacks one or more of our countries’—this is being discussed with absolute seriousness, not just in the corridors of power and not just by marginal voices. Kubilius cites the head of German intelligence as his source, who possesses such verified information.
As of 2025, NATO has already launched a permanent operation in the Baltic Sea called ‘Baltic Sentry’. Its mission is to protect undersea infrastructure. For this task, ten ships from Allied nations patrol the sea on a rotational basis, supported by aircraft and drones.
NATO wants to restrict Russian cargo shipping through the Baltic Sea as much as possible,’ Maria Zakharova told RIA Novosti. ‘This part of Europe has become a confrontation zone, which has grown into an even more acute problem with Sweden and Finland joining NATO.’
If NATO won’t do it; the European Union will.
In November, the European Commission introduced the ‘Military Schengen’ project. During peacetime, member states will have three days to allow the armies of other nations to transit through their territories. In the event of an emergency, this timeframe is reduced to just six hours.
In practical terms—by the time a train carrying Portuguese tanks crosses the Spanish border, it will already have formal permission to transit through France, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
In the current seven-year EU budget, €1.7 billion is allocated for military mobility. In the next cycle, beginning in 2028, this will jump to a full €18 billion.
During the project’s development, 500 bottleneck areas were identified—weak bridges, narrow tunnels, and inadequate roads—the repair of which will require €100 billion. ‘We will find that money too,’ they believe in Brussels.
Many weak points are concentrated where the Polish and Lithuanian railway lines meet, as they still operate on different standards. For several years now, the construction of the ‘Rail Baltica’ high-speed line has been underway, laying ‘European’ narrow-gauge tracks across the three Baltic states.
This is being done so that Putin can never again say with a victorious grin, ‘There was a plan’—as he did in August 2012, when he admitted that preparations for the war against Georgia had been in place since 2006.
For over a year, a drone war has been raging in Ukraine, and until Russian drones flew into Poland, few in Europe would admit that we weren’t ready for such threats,’ Kubilius says today. ‘Poland and the Baltic states are allowing the West to turn them into the next testing ground after Ukraine’—can you guess the author of this phrase in three tries? ‘The West has no use for them in any other status. Do you think Germany wants war on its own soil? No! We are always a thorn in their side. If Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland want to disappear from the world map again, that is their choice.‘
This ‘vision and wisdom’—which could easily belong to an entire cohort of political intellectuals, from Kavelashvili3 to Ramina Beradze4—actually belongs to Lukashenko. This is the justification for the ‘internal market’ as to why he chose Putin’s side and how he is supposedly ‘fighting for survival’.
In fact, Kremlin propaganda is increasingly solidifying a demand to ‘Destroy the Baltics... Wipe them off the face of the earth’ (‘Уничтожить нахрен прибалтику... Стереть с лица земли’)—this time coming from Vladimir Solovyov5. But we know very well that:
a. In Russia, even the madman is not free6.
b. Solovyov is not a madman—he is a part of the state machine.
If that’s the case, are the right questions: ‘What should the Baltic states expect?’ or ‘What should Poland or Finland expect?’
No. The right question is: ‘When should they expect it, and where?‘
‘Lithuania is in the highest-risk zone. Russia may attempt to launch its attack on NATO there,’ says General David Petraeus, who served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency following his military career.
At the end of October, an incident that took place ten days earlier near the Estonian base at Reedo was made public: two drones flying from the Russian side were shot down. Their remains were not found—it is believed they fell into the swamps. Alongside Estonian army units, the camp Reedo also hosts units of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, which, without a doubt, is a target of intense Russian interest.
Even earlier, on a section of the Estonian-Russian border known as the ‘Saatse Boot’, a group of Russian soldiers—estimated at up to 20 men—appeared.
For several days, this incident became the lead story not only in Estonia but across the entire Baltic information space. It triggered parliamentary hearings, the summoning of ministers, and proposals for additional defence funding.
This coincided with a visit by a Finnish parliamentary delegation to Tallinn, where military cooperation became the leading theme. Specifically, both countries intend to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention (the ban on anti-personnel mines) and, before the legal formalities are even finalized, begin preparations for the production, purchase, and deployment of such mines.
This time, you probably won’t need three tries to guess exactly which borders these mines will be placed on.
Furthermore, it turns out that in the ‘frenzy’ of joining NATO, Finland overlooked a crucial detail—the regulations governing the deployment of its military aviation abroad. Now, when Estonia needed them, their ‘brothers and cousins’ were unable to help. The Finnish Parliament will have to repeal this restriction with the utmost urgency.
The story of the Ottawa Convention does not end here. Latvia and Lithuania have already withdrawn from the treaty; now Poland is preparing to do the same. And if anyone asks, ‘What’s the point of prohibitions and playing honest when you have Russia as a neighbour?’ you would be absolutely right.
As it turns out, excessive nobility is of no use either.
‘We are not, but they are already at war with us’—Ben Hodges, the former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, always knows how to describe the situation simply and clearly.
Christmas Day marked exactly one year since an event that has a high chance of being recorded on the first pages of a Third World War history book. The Russian ‘shadow fleet’ tanker, Eagle S, commanded by a Georgian captain, Davit Vadachkoria, used its anchor to sever high-voltage power lines and internet cables lying on the floor of the Baltic Sea, connecting Finland and Estonia.
The tanker was detained by Finnish police for several weeks. Captain Vadachkoria and his Armenian and Indian assistants were prohibited from leaving the country. However, in September, a Helsinki court ruled that the crime fell outside its jurisdiction, as it occurred beyond Finland’s territorial waters. As the Russians would say, ‘Гримасы демократии’ (the Grimaces of Democracy)—and for once, they might just be right, damn it!
The accused were released. Now, in a continuation of these ‘grimaces’, the companies that own the cables are attempting to claim damages from the ship’s owners. However, success is unlikely—the Eagle S is registered in the UAE by a company owned by an Azerbaijani woman and sails under the flag of the Cook Islands.
Exactly one year later, on Christmas Day, December 25, 2025, the cargo ship Fitburg damaged a cable in the Baltic Sea once again. The ship, too, was coming from Russia, with a crew consisting primarily of Russians. It targeted and severed the same cable—Estlink 2—and once again, using an anchor. The Finnish police seized the vessel on December 31 and launched an investigation.
This is no coincidence. This is war. Undeclared.
‘The Kremlin is watching, trying to judge if the US are really committed, are the Europeans really committed,’ General Hodges summarizes. ‘We announced 5% of the budget on military spending, but it is going to be a long time before that translates into real capability. Such incidents will keep happening. And if we do not respond, [the attacks] will only become more frequent.’
If only they listened to General Ben Hodges in NATO capitals as closely as they listen to him in Moscow—January 2026 began with an attack by the Russian ballistic missile, the ‘Oreshnik’, in the Lviv region, near the Polish border.
Related facts:
• The Polish Sejm passed a resolution demanding the relocation of the Russian embassy in Warsaw. The embassy is currently situated next to the Ministry of Defence, which the Sejm views as a direct security threat.
• On November 19, a Latvian naval vessel intercepted the Russian tugboat Nina Sokolova in the international waters of the Baltic Sea. The vessel had previously been flagged for reconnaissance activities. Incidentally, Nina Sokolova, for whom the ship is named, was the first female diver in the Soviet Union.
• Latvia is seriously considering dismantling the railway tracks connecting it to Russia—ensuring the enemy army cannot use the rail network to transport cargo or personnel.
• The Swedish Ministry of Defence has requested the government to include funds in the 2026 budget for the acquisition of long-range (2,000 km radius) cruise and ballistic missiles due to the Russian threat. Note: It is only 1,200 kilometres from Stockholm to Moscow.
• In November, Ukrainian mercenaries hired by Russia carried out an explosion on the Polish railway. In response, Poland will mobilize 10,000 troops specifically to protect the railway network.
• In 2025, the European Union’s military spending reached 400 billion euros—double what it was before Russia’s full-scale intervention in Ukraine in 2022.
• The European Union plans to spend 3.4 trillion euros on defence over the next 10 years. In the spring of 2026, the Rheinmetall plant being built in Lithuania will produce its first batch of 155mm artillery shells.
• Lithuania is beginning the assembly of Swedish CV90 armoured vehicles and, together with Germany’s Rheinmetall, the acquisition of Leopard 2A8 tanks.
• Latvia has completed the construction of a 280-kilometer fence along the Russian border.
• Estonia plans to establish 600 fortified points near the Russian border; 28 of these were already completed in 2025.
• Lithuania’s military spending will reach a record 5.4% of its GDP in 2026.
• Among Latvian citizens, 71% of Latvian speakers support the full restoration of conscription, while 67.5% of Russian speakers oppose it.
• Poland is beginning the acquisition and deployment of anti-drone defence systems, costing over 2 billion euros. The expenditure will be largely covered by the European Union.
